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Aronstam: The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995's Paradigm o

NOTE
THE PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGATION REFORM
ACT OF 1995'S PARADIGM OF AMBIGUITY: A
CIRCUIT SPLIT RIPE FOR CERTIORARI
I.

INTRODUCTION

"Laws are a dead letter without courts to expound
and define their true meaning and operation.",
The Stock Market Crash of 1929, which ignited the fire that fueled
the destruction of the Great Depression,2 prompted Congress as part of
its New Deal legislation to enact the Securities Act of 19333 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 in an effort aimed at curbing a number
of the fraudulent securities practices that precipitated the market's devastating demise.' Alleged securities fraud actions are brought frequently

1.

LAWYER'S WIT AND 'WISDOM: QUOTATIONS ON THE LEGAL PROFESSION, IN BRIEF 153

(Bruce Nash &Allan Zullo eds., 1995) (quoting Alexander Hamilton).
2. See l Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 167 (3d ed. 1998).
3. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a77bbbb (1994)) (mandating that corporations disclose extensive information about themselves at
the time they initially sell their securities).
4. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 78a-7811 (1994)) (mandating that corporations with outstanding stock disclose material
information on an ongoing basis after the initial offering of their securities).
5. See ALLAN B. AFrERMAN, SEC REGULATION OF PUBLIC COMPANIES 7 (1995) (describing a wide array of abusive and fraudulent practices that misled investors and defrauded the securities markets); I Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 2, at 168; infra note 47 and accompanying text
(detailing other fraudulent and abusive securities practices and schemes carried out by unscrupulous investors). By implementing the Securities Act and the Securities Exchange Act, Congress
sought to regulate through procedure. See 1 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 2, at 225-27. In doing
so, it mandated truthful disclosure so as to empower investors with the requisite material information necessary for them to adequately make their own informed investment decisions. See id. at
226; THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECuRITIES REGULATION 7-8 (2d ed. 1990). In the famous
words of Louis D. Brandeis, "sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most
efficient policeman." L. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY ch. 5 (1914). Adopting this philosophy, the aforementioned Acts and the rules promulgated thereunder provide that in the event that
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in federal court by both government and private plaintiffs under section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Securities and Exchange Commission Rule lOb-5.
To state a claim under [section] 10(b) of the Securities and [sic] Exchange Act of 1934 ... and Rule lOb-5, a plaintiff must allege, in
connection with the purchase or sale of securities, the misstatement or
omission of a material fact, made with scienter, upon which the plaintiff justifiably relied and which proximately caused the plaintiff's injury.
This Note centers on a circuit split interpreting the minimum burden of
pleading for actions brought pursuant to section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule lOb-5, a rule which has been lauded as
the most important of the numerous anti-fraud provisions promulgated
by the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC")9 under the rubric
of the aforementioned laws. 10
material information is not disclosed, shareholders who relied on the premise of such disclosure be
afforded judicial redress. See I Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 2, at 225-27.
6. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-7811 (1994).
7. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1998). "All states have some limits on securities issues-socalled 'blue-sky' laws, ostensibly designed to protect investors from 'speculative schemes which
have no more basis than so many feet of "blue sky.'"" VILLAM A. KLEIN & J. MARK RAMSEYER,
BusmEss ASSOCIATIONS: AGENCY, PARTNERSHIPS, AND CORPORATIONS 457 (3d ed. 1997) (quoting Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539, 550 (1917)). It is important to emphasize at the outset
of this Note, however, that the discussion and analysis contained herein deals only with securities
fraud on the federal level as governed by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. While it is certainly conceivable that a prospective plaintiff would bring a securities action against a defendant
on state grounds independent of the requirements prescribed by federal law, this Note centers on
the federal circuit split interpreting the minimum standard of pleading as set forth in the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PSLRA").
8. In re Comshare, Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 542,548 (6th Cir. 1999) (emphasis added).
9. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 established the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") as the agency charged with overseeing and regulating the issuance and trading of
securities in an effort aimed at protecting investors from unfair and fraudulent securities practices.
See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78(d), 78(w).
10. See HAZEN, supra note 5, at 666; see also Richard L. Jacobson & Joshua R. Martin, The
Private SecuritiesLitigation Reform Act of 1995: A Survey of the FirstThree Years, 2 ALI-ABA
COURSE OF STUDY: SEcuRITIEs LITIGATION: PLANNING AND STRATEGIES 861, 868 (1999) (stating
that "most private securities fraud lawsuits allege a violation of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act
and Rule lob-5 promulgated thereunder"). The impact of Rule lOb-5 has been enormous since its
inception. See generally LARRY D. SODERQUIST & THERESA A. GABALDON, SECURITIES
REGULATION 398 (4th ed. 1999) (stating that "RulelOb-5 clearly occupies the preeminent position
among the anti-fraud provisions in the securities laws"). Once again, Congress sought to regulate
securities through procedure, not substance. See 1 Loss & SELIGMAN, supranote 2, at 225-27. The
fundamental purpose of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and its companion legislative enactments is "'to substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor."' Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972) (quoting SEC v. Capital Gains
Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963)). It therefore follows that in order to maintain a cogni-
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Congress' enactment of the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act of 1995 ("PSLRA")" purportedly created a heightened, albeit ambiguous, standard of pleading that prospective plaintiffs alleging securities fraud in contravention of the Securities Exchange Act were required
to meet in order to survive a defendant's motion to dismiss. 2 Section
21D(b)(2) of the PSLRA provides in pertinent part:
In any private action arising under [the Securities Exchange Act] in
which the plaintiff may recover money damages only on proof that the
defendant acted with a particular state of mind, the complaint shall,
with respect to each act or omission alleged to violate this chapter,
state with particularityfacts giving rise to a strong inference that the
defendant acted with the requiredstate of mind. 3

Congress' failure to provide any semblance of statutory guidance
in the PSLRA for interpreting first, what constitutes the "required state
of mind,"'4 and second, what constitutes "a strong inference"' 5 of that
state of mind, has resulted in a three-way split among the federal circuit
courts of appeals, the discussion of which formulates the foundation of
this Note.
Part II of this Note identifies and discusses the pre-PSLRA pleading standards beginning with the Supreme Court's creation of a "scienter" requirement for private lOb-5 causes of action in the landmark decision of Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder 6 Despite the Supreme Court's
failure to articulate whether a showing of recklessness sufficed for
comporting with its intentional state of mind requirement, each of the
circuits uniformly interpreted the answer to that question in the affirmazable action under Rule lOb-5, a plaintiff-shareholder must first make a sufficient showing of scienter inasmuch as the alleged wrongful conduct was "'manipulative or deceptive."' Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462,474 (1977). Lower than projected earnings alone, for example, is
insufficient for maintaining a lOb-5 cause of action absent scienter (i.e. "manipulative or deceptive" conduct) where all material facts have been disclosed. See id. at 474, 476.
11. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737, 743 (1995) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u4(b)(2) (Supp. IV 1999)).
12. The rationale behind Congress' raising of the burden of pleading was to reduce the burdensome level of abusive securities litigation resulting from the mass disunity among the circuits'
respective scienter requirements. See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 104-369, at 41 (1995), reprinted in
1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 740; see also infra note 47 and accompanying text (describing in greater
detail a number of the fraudulent abusive securities practices that prompted Congress to pass the
PSLRA).
13. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (emphasis added).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. 425 U.S. 185, 194 n.12 (1976). The Court established a scienter element for private Rule
lOb-5 cases by requiring plaintiffs to show that defendant acted with "a mental state embracing
intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud." Id.
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tive.' 7 What each of the courts individually defined as recklessness,
however, was far from uniform and led to a circuit split predating the
present one.' s As such, the second section of this Part details the divergent pre-PSLRA recklessness interpretations of the Second and Ninth
Circuits which are representative of the collective disunity among the
other circuit courts interpreting that question. This Part concludes by
describing a number of the problems and concerns emanating from the
aforementioned disunity that motivated Congress' enactment of the
PSLRA.
Part Ill focuses on the PSLRA's enactment and details the state of
affairs and ambiguity leading to the current circuit split interpreting that
Act. More specifically, this Part depicts each of the six major circuit decisions passing judgment on the scienter question under the PSLRA."9
Each of the plaintiffs' complaints in those decisions is examined in the
context of the facts averred in an effort designed to provide a rudimentary understanding of how Rule lOb-5 actions arise and the PSLRA's
implications regarding each of those complaints.
Part IV of this Note encompasses a two-part hypothetical and analytical section. Specifically, Part IV identifies how different plaintiffs
with identical cases and complaints would find themselves with dramatically different results based solely on the rule of jurisdiction in
which they filed suit. The goal of this section is to illustrate the significant ramifications accompanying the circuit split and the serious need
for that split's reconciliation.
Finally, Part V comprises a detailed analysis of the PSLRA's text
and legislative history. This Part seeks to clarify the underlying issues
behind the split as evidence and justification for this Note's conclusion
that the disharmony among the circuits should, and will, be reconciled
by the United States Supreme Court in a manner consistent with the in-

17. See discussion infra Part HI.
18. See S. REP. No. 104-98, at 15 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 694 (concluding that "[t]he courts of appeals [had] interpreted [the preexisting Rule] in different ways, creating distinctly different pleading standards among the circuits").
19. This Note examines the six circuit opinions chronologically by the dates in which they
were decided and are discussed herein in the following order: the Second, Third, Sixth, Ninth,
Eleventh, and Frst Circuit. While the Fifth Circuit also decided a case involving the PSLRA, that
decision assumed without analysis that the PSLRA simply adopted the preexisting pleading standard of the Second Circuit. See Williams v. WMX Techs., Inc., 112 F.3d 175 (5th Cir. 1997). For a
more detailed explanation and analysis of the interpretations adopted by the aforementioned circuits, see infra Part lILA.
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termediate fact-specific interpretations adopted by the First, Sixth, and
Eleventh Circuits.20

II. "SCIENTER" IN THE PRE-PSLRA ERA
A.

Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder

Prior to the enactment of the PSLRA, the United States Supreme
Court, in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,2t decided that a private cause of
action for damages under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act
and Rule lOb-5 required an allegation that the defendant acted with
"'scienter"' comprised of "a mental state embracing intent to deceive,
manipulate, or defraud."2 The Supreme Court in Ernst established,
therefore, that liability for issuing materially false or misleading statements or omissions required proof that such statements or omissions be
disseminated or concealed fraudulently with a state of mind comprised
of the "intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud."
While the Court in Ernst acknowledged that reckless conduct, in
certain circumstances, may rise to the level of intentionally fraudulent
conduct, the Court failed to pass judgment on whether a showing of
recklessness satisfied the requisite burden of pleading for the purposes
of actions brought under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act
and Rule 1Ob-5.2 Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's lack of express
guidance regarding the sufficiency of pleading recklessness in Rule
lOb-5 actions, the circuits deciding the issue unanimously concluded
that Congress had, in fact, intended for a pleading of recklessness to suffice. The facts that each of the circuits required plaintiffs to plead for a
20. The complexity of this circuit split necessitates a detailed introduction of both the background underlying the split and the respective interpretations of the circuits involved in the split
for a true understanding of this Note's conclusion. For a complete discussion of this Note's conclusion, see infra Part V.B, asserting that the Supreme Court should and will resolve the pervasive
ambiguity underlying this circuit split
in a manner consistent with the interpretations of the First,
Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits, inasmuch as the PSLRA sought to effectuate a heightened fact specific standard stricter than the Second Circuit's "motive-opportunity" interpretation and lower than
the Ninth Circuit's "deliberately reckless-conscious misconduct" interpretation.
21. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
22. Id. at 194 n.12.
23. Id.
24. See id. The Court in Ernst explicitly stated, however, that a mere showing of "negligent
wrongdoing" alone was insufficient for satisfying the scienter requirement under the Act. See id. at
210.
25. See id. at 194 n.12.
26. See Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017, 1023 (6th Cir. 1979) (finding
that "[t]he overwhelming majority of courts to address this question after Hochfelder have con-
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satisfactory inference of recklessness, however, were far from uniform
and inevitably led to the enactment of the PSLRA in a congressional effort aimed at bringing unity to the implementation of the Rule.27
B. The Pre-PSLRA Scienter Standardsof the
Second and Ninth Circuits
Viewed together, the Second and Ninth Circuits' differing preexisting standards of recklessness illustrate the original disharmony
among the circuits that led to Congress' passage of the PSLRA. Prior to

the enactment of that Act, Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure2 governed the sufficiency of pleadings for federal actions
brought••29under the securities laws. In In re Time Warner Inc. Securities
Litigation the Second Circuit focused on the first sentence of that Rule,
stating that a plaintiff alleging securities fraud must state with particularity facts giving "'rise to a "strong inference" of fraudulent intent.' ''.
The court then created alternative tests for establishing a sufficiently
""strong inference" of fraudulent intent."' It concluded that a plaintiff
(1) "alleg[ing] facts establishing a motive to commit fraud and an op-

portunity to do so ''32 or (2) "alleg[ing] facts constituting circumstantial

cluded that recklessness satisfies the [section] 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 scienter requirement"). The
Mansbach Court, id. at 1024, then cited as support for this assertion: Nelson v. Serwold, 576 F.2d
1332, 1337 (9thCir. 1978); Rolfv. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 44 (2d Cir. 1978);
Coleco Indus., Inc. v. Berman, 567 F.2d 569, 574 (3d Cir. 1977); First Va. Bankshares v. Benson,
559 F.2d 1307, 1314 (5th Cir. 1977). The Eleventh Circuit went even further, stating that "[e]very
circuit to address the question before the passage of the Reform Act held that a showing of recklessness was sufficient to allege scienter." Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1284
(lith Cir. 1999).
27. The plain text of the PSLRA leaves unchanged the "required state of mind" for pleading
scienter, only mandating that plaintiffs alleging scienter "state with particularity facts giving rise
to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind." 15 U.S.C. § 78u4(b)(2) (Supp. IV 1999). As has been established, every circuit court addressing the question interpreted Ernst as permitting a showing of recklessness to suffice for satisfying "the required state of
mind" for scienter purposes under the Securities Exchange Act. See Bryant, 187 F.3d at 1284.
Hence, the disagreement in the circuit split interpreting the PSLRA centers on what constitutes a
"strong inference" of recklessness.
28. FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b). "In all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other condition of mind of a person may be averred generally." Id.
29. 9 F.3d 259 (2d Cir. 1993).
30. Id. at 268 (emphasis added) (quoting O'Brien v. National Property Analysts Partners,
936 F.2d 674, 676 (2d Cir. 1991)).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 269.
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evidence of either reckless or conscious behavior"33 satisfied the Act's
scienter requirement. In Shields v. CitytrustBancorp, Inc.,35 the Second
Circuit later articulated that an adequate pleading of "[m]otive ... entail[ed] concrete benefits that could be realized by one or more of the
false statements and wrongful nondisclosures alleged" and that a sufficient pleading of "[o]pportunity ... entail[ed] the means and likely
prospect of achieving concrete benefits by the means alleged. 3 6 This
pleading standard was viewed as the most stringent of the circuit standards predating the enactment of the PSLRA.3 7
The Ninth Circuit plainly refused to adopt the Second Circuit's
stringent position that "plaintiffs in securities fraud cases [were required
to] plead facts giving rise to a 'strong inference of fraudulent intent. '
In contrast, that circuit viewed the latter sentence of Rule 9(b) 39 as governing federal securities actions and reasoned that because that sentence
clearly provided that "'[m]alice, intent, knowledge, and other condition
of mind of a person may be averred generally,"'" the Second Circuit's
heightened standard could not be correctly applied. Thus, in order to
comport with the requirements of Rule 9(b), the Ninth Circuit enunciated its position that plaintiffs were only required "to set forth 'specific
descriptions of the [allegedly false] representations made, [and] the reasons for their falsity.' 41 A plaintiff proceeding under this approach,
therefore, was able to aver scienter generally without alleging facts in
his or her complaint supporting his or her allegations of wrongdoing.42
Hence, viewed in conjunction with one another, the Second Circuit's
strong inference threshold standard of recklessness43 was significantly
extended as compared to that of the Ninth Circuit's, which merely re33. Id.; see also Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, Inc., 25 F.3d 1124, 1128 (2d Cir. 1994) ("The
requisite 'strong inference' of fraud may be established either (a) by alleging facts to show that
defendants had both motive and opportunity to commit fraud, or (b) by alleging facts that constitute strong circumstantial evidence of conscious misbehavior or recklessness.").
34. See In re Time Warner,9 F.3d at 268.
35. 25 F.3d 1124 (2d Cir. 1994).
36. Id. at 1130; see also Laura R. Smith, Comment, The Battle Between Plain Meaning and
Legislative History: Which IVill Decide the Standardfor PleadingScienterAfter the PrivateSecurities LitigationReform Act of 1995?, 39 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 577, 586 (1999) (stating that "the
standard set by the Second Circuit was the most stringent standard employed by any circuit").
37. See infra note 45 and accompanying text.
38. In re Glenfed, Inc. Sec. Litig., 42 F.3d 1541, 1545 (9th Cir. 1994).
39. See FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
40. In re Glenfed, 42 F.3d at 1545 (quoting the text of FED. R. Crv. P. 9(b)).
41. Id. at 1548 (emphasis omitted) (second alteration in original) (quoting Blake v. Dierdorff, 856 F.2d 1365, 1369 (9th Cir. 1988)).
42. See In re Time Warner Inc. See. Litig., 9 F.3d 259,268 (2d Cir. 1993).
43. See id.
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quired a pleading encompassing a rudimentary explanation of the allegedly false or misleading statement(s) or omission(s)."
C. ProblemsPrompting the Passageof the PSLRA
The Second and Ninth Circuits' pre-PSLRA standards occupied

positions at opposite ends of the difficulty spectrum in pleading scienter.4" This problem was magnified by the fact that the incongruity among
those circuits was representative of the collectively divergent standards
utilized by the rest of the circuit courts and district courts below them.46
The net result of this disunity was inconsistent pleading requirements
under the mandate of the same federal act, resulting in what Congress
characterized as "significant evidence of abuse in private securities law-

suits."
One such abuse was the frequent practice of unscrupulous investors

who engaged in the filing of unsubstantiated "fishing exhibition" lawsuits in circuits utilizing lenient pleading standards mirroring that of

44. See In re Glenfed, 42 F.3d at 1545.
45. Once again, the Second Circuit's pre-PSLRA "strong inference" standard was regarded
as the most stringent pleading requirement among the circuits, while the Ninth Circuit's general
averment analysis was among the most lenient. See Smith, supra note 36, at 586, 588; see also
John F. Olson et al., PleadingReform, PlaintiffQualificationand Discovery Stays Under the Re.
form Act, 51 Bus. LAW. 1101, 1107-12 (1996).
46. See S. REP. No. 104-98, at 15 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 694 (observing that "[tihe courts of appeals ... interpreted Rule 9(b) in different ways, creating distinctly
different pleading standards among the circuits").
47. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 104-369, at 31 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 730.
Congress identified a number of those abuses in the PSLRA's conference report, stating:
The House and Senate Committees heard evidence that abusive practices committed in
private securities litigation include: (1) the routine filing of lawsuits against issuers of
securities and others whenever there is a significant change in an issuer's stock price,
without regard to any underlying culpability of the issuer, and with only faint hope that
the discovery process might lead eventually to some plausible cause of action; (2) the
targeting of deep pocket defendants, including accountants, underwriters, and individuals who may be covered by insurance, without regard to their actual culpability; (3) the
abuse of the discovery process to impose costs so burdensome that it is often economical for the victimized party to settle; and (4) the manipulation by class action lawyers of
the clients whom they purportedly represent.
Id. Congress also observed that meritless securities fraud litigation "unnecessarily increase[d] the
cost of raising capital and chill[ed] corporate disclosure, [and was] often based on nothing more
than a company's announcement of bad news, not evidence of fraud." S. REP. No. 104-98, at 4
(1995), reprintedin 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 683.
48. See S. REP. No. 104-98, at 4; see also H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at 37 (noting that
the Committee heard testimony likening the pre-PSLRA discovery process in securities actions to
one resembling a fishing expedition). The Committee continued, noting the observations of one
witness who testified that "'once [a] suit is filed, the plaintiffs law firm proceeds to search
through all of the company's documents and take[s] endless depositions for the slightest positive
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the Ninth Circuit's. 49 Assume that in response to a statement by a corporation that it had experienced lower than projected sales figures, that

corporation's stock experienced a significant decrease in market value.
By pleading generalized averments of fraud in those jurisdictions, disgruntled shareholders could survive dismissal and gain entry into discovery with only the "faint hope" of finding pieces of evidence legitimizing their otherwise unsupported securities fraud claims."

Compounding this practice was the contingency system of attorneys'
fees because plaintiffs engaging in this conduct had little, if anything, to
lose since they did not have to risk their own money.5'
Of even greater concern to Congress was the serious practice on
the part of unscrupulous investors filing strike suits. 5 2 This abuse was
similarly exacerbated by the structure of attorneys' fees.53 Contingent
fee arrangements created the possibility of warped incentives on the part

of "entrepreneurial" attorneys to encourage plaintiffs with meritless ac-

comment which they can claim induced the plaintiff to invest and any shred of evidence that the
company knew a downturn was coming."' Id. (citation omitted).
49. See supra note 45 (opining that the Ninth Circuit's pre-PSLRA pleading standard was
the most lenient among the circuits).
50. See H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-369, at 31.
51. See W. Kent Davis, The InternationalView of Attorney Fees in Civil Suits: Why Is the
UnitedStates the "Odd Man Out" in How It Pays Its Lawyers?, 16 AmJz. J. INT'L& COwE. L. 361,
378 (1999) (stating that under the contingent fee system, the client can shift the monetary "risk
inherent in his case to the lawyer. If the client does not recover, the lawyer receives no fee. [Conversely,] [i]f a client who agrees to pay his lawyer an hourly fee does not recover, he incurs a
negative return (the lawyer's charge)").
52. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at 32 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730,
731. Strike suits are actions brought by parties not with the intention of prevailing on the merits at
trial; but, instead with the intention of winning a profitable settlement. See id.; BLACK'S LAW
DICIONARY 1448 (7th ed. 1999) (defining a strike suit as "[a] suit ...often based on no valid
claim, brought either for nuisance value or as leverage to obtain a favorable or inflated settlement"); see also Douglas C. Buffone, Note, PredatoryAttorneys and ProfessionalPlaintiffs: Reforms Are Needed to Limit Vexatious Securities Litigation, 23 HOFSTRA L. REv. 655, 663-64
(1995) (analyzing the varying stages of a securities law strike suit).
53. See Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit: Litigation Without Foundation?, 7 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 55, 84 (1991) (concluding that "[tihe principal beneficiaries of [shareholder litigation ... appear to be attorneys, who win fee awards in 90 percent of settled suits"); see also Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role in ClassAction and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendationsfor Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 7
(1991). Macey and Miller state:
[T]he single most salient characteristic of class and derivative litigation is the existence
of "entrepreneurial" plaintiffs' attorneys. Because these attorneys are not subject to
monitoring by their putative clients, they operate largely according to their own selfinterest, subject only to whatever constraints might be imposed by bar discipline, judicial oversight, and their own sense of ethics and fiduciary responsibilities.
Id. at 7-8.
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tions to file generalized complaints in those circuits permitting them
to
4
do so with the calculated hope of achieving a profitable settlement.
Congress passed the PSLRA in a self-proclaimed effort to bring
about consistency in the law and, in the process, dispel much of the confusion and injustice precipitating that Act's enactment.55 Unfortunately,
while the PSLRA unquestionably succeeded in raising the burden of
pleading scienter throughout the circuits to a level at least as high as the
Second Circuit's preexisting approach, the ambiguity in that Act's
statutory language and legislative history has had the opposite effect.
This has created such confusion and inconsistency among the circuits
that it appears inevitably destined and ripe for the United States Supreme Court to determine the meaning of the elusive scienter standard
once and for all 6

1H. THE ENACTMENT OF THE PSLRA
After examining the relevant statutes at the heart of this split, it is
no surprise that the circuits have divided in attempting to identify and
carry out Congress' intent." Under the PSLRA, "the mental state required for securities fraud liability is distinct from the level of pleading
required to infer that mental state.""8 It therefore bears repeating that a
court interpreting this Act "must make two separate determinations: (1)
what is the required state of mind; and (2) what constitutes a strong inference of that state of mind." 59

In enacting the PSLRA, Congress failed to take advantage of the
opportunity for clarifying the "state of mind" 6 requirement of the Securities Exchange Act as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Ernst some
twenty years before.' In fact, not only did Congress fail to statutorily
affirm or proscribe the adequacy of pleading facts inferring recklessness

54. See Macey &Miller, supra note 53, at 7.
55. See H.R. CoNF.REP. No. 104-369, at 31.
56. For this Note's conclusion that the circuit split will be reconciled in a manner consistent
with the interpretations of the First, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits, see infra Part V.B.
57. Once again, the PSLRA fails to articulate in its statutory text (1) what the "required state
of mind" is and (2) what constitutes a sufficient showing of that "state of mind" for pleading scienter. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (Supp. IV 1999).
58. In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 975 (9th Cir. 1999).
59. Id.
60. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2).
61. See supra Part II.A (discussing the Court's landmark Ernst & Ernst decision and the
confusion resulting therefrom).
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for scienter purposes as interpreted collectively by the circuit courts, 62
assuming that its silence on Ernst's holding and that case's progeny signified a legislative acquiescence to the circuits' universal recklessness
interpretation, Congress failed to provide any statutory guidance regarding what level of facts was necessary for inferring recklessness in
the context of Rule lOb-5 pleadings and actions.63 This Note posits that
this precise ambiguity proximately caused the present circuit split
among the circuit courts of appeals interpreting the PSLRA.64
A.

The Circuits Comprising the Split

1. The Second Circuit
The Second Circuite was the first circuit court to pass judgment on
the "scienter" question after the enactment of the PSLRA. In Press v.
Chemical Investment Services Corp.,6 a buyer of a treasury bill brought
a federal securities fraud action against his broker-dealers alleging that
they had violated Rule lOb-5 by having failed to disclose the fact that
the funds purportedly due him upon the maturity of his bill would not be
immediately available.67 It was the plaintiff's contention that "the period
over which the yield should have been calculated was longer than the
[defendants] represented, [thereby making] the yield advertised ...
fraudulently inaccurate." '
Applying the scienter requirement under the PSLRA, the Press
court stated that a plaintiff is required to "either (a) allege facts to show
that 'defendants had both motive and opportunity to commit fraud' or
(b) allege facts that 'constitute strong circumstantial evidence of con62. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text (explaining that every circuit circuit and
an overwhelming majority of district courts addressing Ernst's scienter requirement interpreted
recklessness as sufficing).
63. See supranotes 26-27 and accompanying text.
64. Recklessness is generally defined as "[conduct whereby the actor does not desire harmful consequence but nonetheless foresees the possibility and consciously takes the risk." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1277 (7th ed. 1999). Inasmuch as the proper showing of recklessness under the
PSLRA is the ultimate issue underlying this split, however, this Note is unable to postulate a uniform definition of that state of mind in the context of securities actions brought under Rule lOb-5.
The varying approaches of the six circuit decisions are detailed in the proceeding sections.
65. The Second Circuit is comprised of Connecticut, New York, and Vermont. See 28

U.S.C. § 41 (1994).
66.
67.
68.
tured the
Id.

166 F.3d 529 (2d Cir. 1999).
See id. at 533.
Id. The court continued, stating that the plaintiff contended that the defendants "structransaction in this manner to allow themselves more time to use [the plaintiff's] funds."
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scious misbehavior or recklessness."' 6 Applied to the facts in the case,
the court in Pressheld that the plaintiff's bare pleading of motive on the
part of his broker to withhold his funds and his concomitant opportunity
to "float 7 or use the funds for his own economic gains sufficed for the
purposes of adequately alleging scienter."
Thus, in Press, the Second Circuit, proceeding without analysis,
implicitly reasoned that Congress' enactment of the PSLRA universally
adopted its circuit's pre-PSLRA "strong inference" approach." More
specifically, because the Second Circuit's pre-PSLRA interpretation of
scienter required a plaintiff to plead facts supporting a "strong inference" of fraudulent intent, 3 the court in Press interpreted Congress'
codification of its identical language in the statutory text of the PSLRA
as congressional intent signifying the adoption of that circuit's entire
two-prong approach for eliciting the "required state of mind" under the
PSLRA.74
2. The Third Circuit
The Second Circuit's interpretation of the PSLRA in Press was
adopted a few months later by the Third Circuie 6 in In re Advanta Corp.
Securities Litigation." In that case, a class of Advanta shareholders
brought a securities fraud action against the corporation alleging that the
corporation, a leading issuer of MasterCard and VISA credit cards, had
"made false and misleading statements and material omissions regarding the company's earnings potential and value of its stock."78 The class
alleged that the company's twenty million dollar first quarter losses
69. Id. at 538 (quoting Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp., Inc., 25 F.3d 1124, 1128 (2d Cir.

1994)).
70. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
71. See id.
72. See In re Time Warner Inc. Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d 259, 269 (2d Cir. 1993). Additionally, the
Fifth Circuit, in Williams v. WMX Technologies, Inc., 112 F.3d 175 (5th Cir. 1997), similarly
reached a decision that comported with the Second Circuit's conclusion in Pressby holding, without a detailed analysis or discussion, that Congress intended to codify the Second Circuit's preex-

isting approach in the PSLRA. See id. at 178. The jurisdictions in the Fifth Circuit include Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas. See 28 U.S.C. § 41 (1994).
73. See In re Time Warner, 9 F.3d at 268.

74. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (Supp. IV 1999) (requiring a plaintiff to "state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of
mind") (emphasis added).
75. See discussion supraPart IlI.A.I.
76. The Third Circuit consists of Delaware, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and the Virgin Is-

lands. See 28 U.S.C. § 41 (1994).
77. 180 F.3d 525 (3d Cir. 1999).
78. Id. at 528.
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were the byproduct of "Advanta's decision to implement aggressive
' the substance and risk
techniques to attract new credit card customers,"79
of which the company failed to disclose to its shareholders 0 The plaintiffs also pointed to statements made by Advanta executives predating
the company's first quarter losses, which projected that the company
would experience substantial increases in its revenue."' The plaintiffs
contended that even if the defendants lacked the subjective belief that
the forecasts were false, the executives acted recklessly in forming their
conclusions and communicating the incorrect "forward looking statements" to the public. 2
After a detailed analysis of what the Third Circuit deemed to be
"inconclusive" legislative intent, 3 that court in In re Advanta concluded
that the Second Circuit's interpretation of the PSLRA in Press' was
correct.' The court reasoned that because the Second Circuit's motiveopportunity test under the PSLRA "must now be supported by facts
stated 'with particularity,"' 86 the burden of pleading was sufficiently
heightened to "address the previous ease of alleging motive and opportunity on the part of corporate officers to commit securities fraud" without any further showing." The Third Circuit emphasized the fact that the
Second Circuit's preexisting approach was regarded as the most stringent of all the pleading standards.88 Thus, by codifying that circuit's
"strong inference" language, the Third Circuit reasoned that Congress
must have intended to codify that circuit's approach.89 The In re Advanta court nevertheless found that the plaintiffs had failed to allege
79. Id.
80. See id. Some of these "techniques" included:
[I]ssuing cards with lower teaser rates and longer introductory periods than standard industry practice, resulting in riskier customers and, ultimately, a decrease in revenues as
many of the new customers defaulted on their repayment obligations. The increased
delinquency rates produced greater "charge-offs," which are the costs incurred by the
credit card company when a card holder's balance becomes uncollectible.
Id.
81. Seeid.
82. See id. at 539.
83. See id. at 533.
84. See Press v. Chemical Inv. Servs. Corp., 166 F.3d 529, 537-38 (2d Cir. 1999) (interpreting the PSLRA as adopting the Second Circuit's preexisting motive-opportunity test as satisfying
the scienter requirement).
85. See In re Advanta, 180 F.3d at 534.
86. Id. at 535 (quoting the PSLRA, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (West Supp. 1999)).
87. Id.
88. See id. at 534.
89. See id. at 533-35; see also supra note 45 and accompanying text (noting that the Second
Circuit's pre-PSLRA scienter approach was the most stringent pleading standard among the federal circuit courts of appeals).
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sufficient facts constituting a "strong inference" of scienter and dismissed their complaint. 9°
3. The Sixth Circuit
The Sixth Circuit91 was the first circuit to deviate from the interpretations of the Second and Third Circuits, ruling that Congress had
not intended for the PSLRA to codify the Second Circuit's preexisting
motive-opportunity test. In In re Comshare, Inc. Securities Litigation,9
the Sixth Circuit adjudicated a suit brought by nine plaintiffshareholders alleging that the defendant-corporation had committed securities fraud in contravention of the Securities Exchange Act after
having engaged in accounting practices that violated not only their own
corporate revenue recognition polices, but also generally accepted accounting principles ("GAAP").93 In reaction to the corporation's announcement that it was delaying the release of one of its quarterly reports after discovering the questionable recording practices of one of its
foreign subsidiaries, Comshare's stock plummeted in value over forty
percent.94 The shareholders alleged that the revenue recording practices
"were more than mere negligence[] and were instead part of a scheme to
defraud the public."95
After the corporation moved to dismiss, the Sixth Circuit held that
"plaintiffs may plead scienter in [section] 10b [sic] or Rule lOb-5 cases
by alleging facts giving rise to a strong inference of recklessness, but
not by alleging facts merely establishing that a defendant had the motive
and opportunity to commit securities fraud." 96 In In re Comshare, the
court relied on the premise that "those courts addressing motive and opportunity in Securities Act cases have held only that facts showing a

90. See In re Advanta, 180 F.3d at 539-40.
91. Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio, and Tennessee are the states located in the Sixth Circuit. See

28 U.S.C. § 41 (1994).
92. 183 F.3d 542 (6th Cir. 1999).
93. See id. at 546. Generally accepted accounting principles ("GAAP") are defined as "[t]he
conventions, rules, and procedures that define approved accounting practices at a particular time.
These principles are issued by the Financial Accounting Standards Board for use by accountants in
preparing financial statements. The principles include not only broad guidelines of general application but also detailed practices and procedures." BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY 692 (7th ed. 1999).
94. See In re Comshare, 183 F.3d at 546.
95. Id. at 547. More specifically, the plaintiff-shareholders alleged that the fraudulent
scheme enabled the defendants "to inflate stock prices so that [the] individual Defendants could
sell their own shares at high prices. Plaintiffs also claim[ed] that [the] individual Defendants profited from this scheme because their compensation plans were tied to the price of Comshare's
stock." Id.
96. Id. at 549.
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motive and opportunity may adequately allege scienter, not that the existence of motive and opportunity may support, as scienter itself, liability under [section] 10b [sic] or Rule lOb-5" as necessary for comporting with the heightened scienter standard prescribed by the PSLRA. The
Sixth Circuit recognized that "facts regarding motive and opportunity
may be 'relevant to pleading circumstances from which a strong inference of fraudulent scienter may be inferred,' 9. but reiterated its position
that motive and opportunity alone do not sufficiently establish "a strong
inference of reckless[ness]," as mandated by Congress' passage of the
PSLRA. 99
Applying its interpretation to the facts of the case, the court held
that the plaintiffs had "failed to plead facts that show[ed] that the revenue recognition errors at Comshare's ... subsidiary should have been
obvious to Comshare or that Comshare consciously disregarded 'red
flags' that would have revealed the errors prior to their inclusion in
public statements."' ' Consequently, the court concluded that the shareholders' complaint contained insufficient facts which did not "give rise
to a strong inference of scienter" and granted the defendant's motion to
dismiss.' ° '
4. The Ninth Circuit
In In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Securities Litigation,'02 the Ninth
Circuit' 3 built upon the Sixth Circuit's decision in In re Comshare,
Inc.'O4 and, in the process, effectuated the most stringent burden of
pleading among the circuits under the PSLRA to date."5 In that case,
both a securities class action and a shareholders' derivative suit were
filed against Silicon Graphics, Inc. and six of its top officers. 1' The
plaintiffs' complaint alleged that the company had issued a number of

97. Id. at 551 (emphasis added).
98. Id. (quoting In re Baesa See. Litig., 969 F. Supp. 238, 242 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)).
99. Id.

100. Id. at 554.
101. Id.
102. 183 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 1999).
103. The jurisdictions covered by the Ninth Circuit include Alaska, Arizona, California,
Guam, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, and Washington. See 28 U.S.C. § 41 (1994).
104. 183 F.3d 542, 549 (6th Cir. 1999).
105. At the time this Note was written, no additional cases were pending in any of the Circuit
Courts of Appeals.
106. See In re Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 979-80. This Note only focuses on the securities
fraud cause of action and not the shareholders' derivative cause of action. The latter deals with
issues concerning the fiduciary duties that the directors and officers of the company owed to Silicon Graphics and its shareholders. See id. at 980.
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misleading statements in an effort to inflate the value of the company's
stock while engaging in "'massive' insider trading."' ' The thrust of the
securities fraud allegations centered on statements made by the company reporting forty-five percent growth for the corporation's 1995 fiscal year and projecting similar growth for the following fiscal year."
After the company failed to meet those projections, the plaintiffs alleged
that the corporation's officers had engaged in a scheme "to restore investor confidence by downplaying" the corporation's problems.W In
carrying out this "'conspiracy,"' the company's officers issued a number of statements, which plaintiffs asserted were designed to inflate the
value of the company's stock.1 When the statements subsequently
turned out to be incorrect, the plaintiffs filed suit alleging federal securities fraud pursuant to Rule l0b-5."
In affirming the lower court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' complaint, the court in In re Silicon Graphicsheld "that a private securities
plaintiff proceeding under the PSLRA must plead, in great detail, facts
that constitute strong circumstantial evidence of deliberately reckless or
conscious misconduct."' 2 After analyzing the aforementioned postPSLRA decisions of the Second, Third, and Sixth Circuits, the Ninth
Circuit reasoned "that because the joint committee expressly rejected
the 'motive and opportunity' and 'recklessness' tests when raising the
standard, Congress must have intended a standard that lies beyond the
Second Circuit standard."". The court stated that although the plaintiffs
had alleged "facts giving rise to some inference of fraudulent intent,
insufficient to create a strong inference
[the] factual allegations [were]
' 4
of deliberate recklessness.""
Hence, the standard enunciated in the court's decision in In re Silicon Graphicsexceeded even that of the Sixth Circuit's rejection of the
two-part test adopted by the Second Circuit in Press and the Third Cir107. Id. at 980.
108. See id.
109. Id. at 981.
110. See id.
111. See id. at 975.
112. Id. at 974.
113. Id. at 979. The court continued, stating:
Had Congress merely sought to adopt the Second Circuit standard, it easily could have
done so.... It follows that plaintiffs proceeding under the PSLRA can no longer aver
intent in general terms of mere "motive and opportunity" or "recklessness," but rather,
must state specific facts indicating no less than a degree of recklessness that strongly
suggests actual intent.
Id. For a more detailed examination of the PSLRA's legislative history, see infra Part V.A.2.a.
114. In re Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 980.
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cuit in In re Advanta." In doing so, the Ninth Circuit's interpretation,
requiring that a plaintiff give detailed pleadings of facts constituting
"strong circumstantial evidence of deliberate[] reckless[ness] or conscious misconduct,"' 16 resulted in a circuit split ironically resembling the
one originally
prompting Congress to enact the PSLRA in the first
7
place.'
5. The Eleventh Circuit
The Eleventh Circuit"' was the next circuit court to pass judgment
on the PSLRA issue. In Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc.," 9 the court was
unwilling to follow the "strong circumstantial evidence of deliberately
reckless or conscious misconduct"'' 0 standard established by the Ninth
Circuit only a few days earlier.' 2' In Bryant, a class of Apple South, Inc.
shareholders brought a lawsuit against the corporation and several of its
officers, alleging that the defendant had made a number of "false and
misleading statements and material omissions in order to inflate the
value of the company's stock in violation of the Securities and [sic] Exchange Act of 1934."' The defendant later announced that a number of
its recent acquisitions had negatively impacted Apple South's business,
that its earnings per share would be well below the thirty to thirty-five
percent growth that it had originally forecasted, and that it was scaling
back on expansion plans."z As a result, Apple South's stock plummeted
l
by over forty percent in value, prompting the shareholders to file suit. 12
After the plaintiffs sought to have the district court adopt a standard

115. See In re Comshare, Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 542, 549 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding only
that facts encompassing a mere showing of motive and opportunity were insufficient under the
PSLRA for supporting a strong inference of recklessness).
116. In re Silicon Graphics,183 F.3d at 974.
117. This Note concludes that the current circuit split is ironic insofar as the Second and
Ninth Circuits have switched their pre-PSLRA positions, with each at opposite ends of the spectrum of difficulty in pleading scienter in federal securities fraud cases. See supra note 45 and accompanying text. Today, the Ninth Circuit has effectively created the most stringent pleading
standard while the Second Circuit's adoption of its pre-PSLRA standard has become the most lenient. See supranote 45 and accompanying text.
118. The Eleventh Circuit encompasses Alabama, Georgia, and Florida. See 28 U.S.C. § 41

(1994).
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

187 F.3d 1271 (llthCir. 1999).
In re Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 974.
See Bryant, 187 F.3d at 1283.
Id. at 1273.
See id at 1274.
See id.
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consistent with the one adopted by the Second Circuit in Press,' "the
district court recommended that [the Circuit] Court permit an interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)."' 2 6
After allowing the appeal,'27 the Eleventh Circuit retreated from the
Ninth Circuit's stringent pleading requirement, holding that "a securities
fraud plaintiff must plead scienter with particular facts that give rise to a
strong inference that the defendant acted in a severely reckless manner.1' Expressing its "basic agreement"'29 with the Sixth Circuit's
holding in In re Comshare, Inc. Securities Litigation,3" the Eleventh
Circuit rejected the Second Circuit's position that the Act codified the
motive and opportunity test as sufficient for adequately pleading scienter under the PSLRA."' The court in Bryant further agreed with the
Sixth Circuit's rationale that while evidence of motive and opportunity
on the part of defendants to commit fraud might be relevant to showing
severe evidence of recklessness, that alone was insufficient for pleading
scienter under the PSLRA in Rule lOb-5 actions.3 2 Unlike the Sixth Circuit, though, the Eleventh Circuit's holding required plaintiffs pleading
scienter to allege facts giving "rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted in a severely reckless manner."'33 While facially this appears
to raise the Eleventh Circuit's burden of pleading to a higher level than
that of the Sixth Circuit's pleading requirement, '4 in reality, the two
holdings are the same in that both delegate to the trial judge the discretion for assessing the merits of each case based on the fact sensitive nature of the particular circumstances surrounding each case.'3" The case
was then remanded3 6to the district court for proceedings consistent with
that interpretation.

125. See Press v. Chemical Inv. Servs. Corp., 166 F.3d 529, 537-38 (2d Cir. 1999) (interpreting the PSLRA as adopting the Second Circuit's preexisting motive-opportunity approach).
126. Bryant, 187 F.3d at 1275.
127. See id.
128. Id. at 1287.
129. Id. at 1283.
130. See 183 F.3d 542, 549 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding "that plaintiffs may plead scienter ... by
alleging facts giving rise to a strong inference of recklessness, but not by alleging facts merely
establishing that a defendant had the motive and opportunity to commit securities fraud").
131. See Bryant, 187 F.3d at 1287.
132. See id. at 1285; see also In re Comshare, 183 F.3d at 551.
133. Bryant, 187 F.3d at 1287 (emphasis added).
134. Again, the Sixth Circuit only announced a standard that precluded plaintiffs from alleging motive and opportunity by itself without any reference to the Eleventh Circuit's "severely
reckless" language. CompareIn re Comshare, 183 F.3d at 549, with Bryant, 187 F.3d at 1287.
135. See Bryant, 187 F.3d at 1287; In re Comshare, 183 F.3d at 554.
136. See Bryant, 187 F.3d at 1287.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol28/iss4/7

18

Aronstam: The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995's Paradigm o
2O00

PSLRA: PARADIGM OF AMBIGUITY

6. The First Circuit
The next and final circuit to pass judgment on the PSLRA's elusive
pleading requirement to date 37 was the First Circuit 38 in Greebel v. FTP
Software, Inc. 39 After FTP's stock reached a trading high of more than
thirty-eight dollars per share, the company announced that its sales
growth had declined and that the company would be experiencing lower
than projected earnings.' That same day, FTP's stock lost more than
fifty percent of its value. 141 Less than nine months later, the stock was
trading at only eight dollars per share.142 A number of disgruntled investors in the defendant-corporation's publicly traded stock filed suit
alleging, among other things, violations of section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act and Rule lOb-5, accusing the defendants of orchestrating a scheme to inflate the company's stock by disseminating materially false statements and omissions. 3 The defendants then moved to
dismiss.' 4
In Greebel, the First Circuit announced a pleading standard consistent with and similar to those adopted by the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits, respectively. The First Circuit held that the facts alleged in a Rule4
10b-5 complaint "must now present a strong inference of scienter."'
More specifically, the court rejected the motive-opportunity test as being sufficient in and of itself to create a strong inference of scienter, instead adopting a more fact-specific inquiry.' 46 Pursuant to the court's
new standard, lower courts retained their equitable powers and discretion to assess the fact specific details of each case 47 subject to the caveat
that "[a] mere reasonable inference is insufficient to survive a motion to
dismiss.' 4' Like that of the Sixth Circuit,' 49 the First Circuit's holding'50

137. Once again, as of the time that this Note was written, no additional cases were pending
in any of the Circuit Courts of Appeals.
138. The jurisdictions located in the First Circuit are Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire,
Puerto Rico, and Rhode Island. See 28 U.S.C. § 41 (1994).
139. 194 F.3d 185 (1st Cir. 1999).

140. See id. at 188.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

See id.
See id.
See id. at 189-91.
See id. at 191.
Id. at 196.
See id.
See id.
Id.
See In re Comshare, Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 542, 549 (6th Cir. 1999).
See Greebel, 194 F.3d at 196.
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was free from any reference to the "severely reckless" standard enunciated by the Eleventh Circuit in Bryant.'
The plaintiffs' case in Greebel centered on factual allegations that
the defendants consistently inflated the company's earnings by engaging
in accounting and recording practices that were improper under
GAAP' 52 The plaintiffs reasoned that because their complaint contained
facts establishing that the defendants had "unlimited return rights" tied
to the company's sales figures, they had pleaded sufficient circumstantial evidence inferring not only motive and opportunity on the part of
the defendants to commit fraud, but also conscious wrongdoing.'53 The
court, though, dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint after finding that the
claims were "either insufficiently particularized or, where particularized, [did] not permit a strong inference of scienter."'
IV. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CIRcurr SPLIT

The differing interpretations of the circuits involved in this split
translate into serious uncertainties for prospective plaintiffs. As demonstrated below,'55 different groups of parties bringing identical cases under the same federal law could conceivably find themselves with dramatically different results, namely, some proceeding into discovery and
others having their complaints dismissed, depending on the jurisdiction
in which they filed their respective actions.
A. An Illustrative10b-5 Hypothetical
To illustrate the significance of this problem, assume that on
March 30, 2000, less than two months before the end of XYZ Corporation's fiscal year, the corporation's Chief Executive Officer and President, Mr. Phillip Alexander, reported to its shareholders that the company pleasingly anticipated that upon year's end it would easily reach
its strategic goals of achieving forty percent growth and generating annual earnings in excess of two hundred million dollars for the first time
151. See Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1287 (11th Cir. 1999). In fact, not
only was the First Circuit's holding free from any reference to the Eleventh Circuit's severely
reckless language, the court in Greebel appeared to view its decision in a manner that was consistent with the holding of the Bryant court. See Greebel, 194 F.3d at 196.
152. See Greebel, 194 F.3d at 201; see also supra note 93 (defining GAAP as the procedures
governing accountants in the preparation of financial statements).
153.

See Greebel, 194 F.3d at 201.

154. Id.
155. See infra Parts IV.A, 1V.B (illustrating how the varying interpretations of the PSLRA
can unevenly impact identical plaintiffs suing in different jurisdictions).
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in that corporation's ten year history of producing digital widgets and
gadgets. Furthermore, assume that XYZ's officers and directors had
stock incentive and bonus programs that were directly tied to the market
value of that company's stock, which is a common practice.156
Suppose further that immediately following this release, the market
value of XYZ's publicly traded stock increased from thirty dollars per
share on March 30th to a trading high of forty-eight dollars per share
some four weeks thereafter in late April. On April 28th, after speculative media reports surfaced probing into questionable internal practices
of XYZ's officers and employees, the corporation's stock experienced a
brief period of decline. This prompted XYZ's board of directors to
authorize its President to once again issue a public statement assuring its
shareholders that XYZ's strategic goals and forecasts were indeed correct and that there was absolutely no reason for concern. This temporarily restored stability to XYZ's stock.
Less than two weeks later, however, suppose that XYZ announced
that the company had delayed the release of its annual growth and
earnings reports for the fiscal year 2000 pending the investigation of
certain accounting discrepancies in the corporation's financial statements and procedures. This delay triggered a downward plunge in the
value of XYZ's stock from its trading high of forty-eight dollars per
share to an eventual low of twenty-three dollars per share, when the actual reports were released a month and a half later.
Assume further that the actual reports revealed that contrary to
XYZ's projections and manifestations, the corporation had failed to
even approach their forty percent growth goal (in actuality only having
achieved twenty-two percent growth) and that the company was well off
of its projected earnings of two hundred million dollars (instead generating only one hundred seventy-five million dollars). In reaction to this
information, the market devalued XYZ's shares to a five year low of
fourteen dollars per share and a number of disgruntled shareholderplaintiffs, upon certification of a class, brought suit against XYZ, its of156. See In re Comshare, Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 542, 547 (6th Cir. 1999) (stating that the
directors' "compensation plans were tied to the price of [the company's] stock"); see also, e.g.,
Chalverus v. Pegasystems, Inc., 59 F. Supp. 2d 226, 236 (D. Mass. 1999) ("[O]fficers ... ha[ve] a
motive [to] keep stock prices high because their compensation packages [often] includeol stock
and stock options."); Malin v. IVAX Corp., 17 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1358 (S.D. Fla. 1998)
('[O]btaining performance-based bonuses [and] increasing the value of an officer's stock options
or stock sales ... [are] common[I day-to-day goals of corporate management .... ); Salinger v.
Projectavision, Inc., 934 F. Supp. 1402, 1414 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) ("It is true that officers and directors typically have part of their compensation linked to the price of the company's shares and will
naturally have an interest in a high stock price.").
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ficers, and its directors alleging, among other claims, securities fraud in
violation of section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act and Rule lOb5. The officers and directors responded by filing a motion to dismiss the
plaintiffs' complaint.
B. Applying the PSLRA to this Hypothetical
It is not disputed among the circuits that the PSLRA mandates that
in order to survive XYZ's motion to dismiss, the class of plaintiffs in
this case must "state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference"'' 7 of recklessness on the part of XYZ and the other defendants in
disseminating what turned out to be materially false information." 8 In
reality, the circuit split centers on what constitutes such a showing, and
this is where the plaintiffs would encounter dramatically different realities depending on the jurisdictions in which they filed suit.
1. The Second and Third Circuit Approach
If the plaintiffs filed suit in a federal court located in New York,
New Jersey, or Delaware, for example, the Second and Third Circuit
approaches of Press'59 and In re Advanta6 would govern in assessing
the sufficiency of the plaintiffs' complaint for PSLRA pleading purposes. Based on the limited facts that have been outlined in the above
hypothetical, the plaintiffs would likely allege that the defendants had
both the motive and opportunity to disclose the misstatements concerning the company's performance and to subsequently remain silent concerning the speculation surrounding the company's problems. More
specifically, they would assert in their complaints facts inferring that the
corporate insiders possessed both (1) the opportunity to disseminate the
materially false statements from the inherent nature of their positions
and (2) the motive to do so inasmuch as their bonuses, in addition to
their personal stock holdings, were directly tied to XYZ's stock value.
Therefore, a federal court in these circuits would likely find that a complaint pleading these boilerplate facts established a satisfactory showing
that XYZ and its officers and directors "'had both motive and opportu157. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (Supp. IV 1999).
158. For the purposes of this illustrative hypothetical, this Note assumes that the other elements of Rule lOb-5 private causes of action have been satisfied. For identification of those elements, see 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1994); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (1998) (requiring a plaintiff alleging
securities fraud under Rule lob-5 to show, in addition to scienter, the: (1) misstatement or omis-

sion, (2) of a material fact, (3) on which plaintiff relied, (4) proximately causing his or her injury).
159. See discussion supra Part llI.A.1.
160. See discussion supra Part llJ.A.2.
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nity to commit fraud"".161 for the purposes of surviving the defendants'
motion to dismiss.
2. The First, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuit Approach
Supposing that the plaintiffs filed suit in Massachusetts, Ohio, or
Florida, a federal district court presiding over the case would be precluded from allowing as sufficient a complaint containing mere factual
allegations of motive and opportunity to commit fraud for the purposes
of surviving XYZ's motion to dismiss. 2 A court in these jurisdictions
would be bound by its circuit court's mandate requiring the shareholderplaintiffs to allege facts giving rise to a "strong inference" of scienter
above and beyond the inferences emanating from mere averments of
motive and opportunity.' Perhaps the class could successfully allege
facts concerning the following as additional evidence for supplying a
judge with enough facts to tip the equitable scales of discretion in favor
of allowing their action to proceed into discovery: (1) the timing of the
releases; (2) the subjective or objective knowledge of the directors in
authorizing the President to speak; or (3) the fact that the public speculation regarding the 'questionable practices' of XYZ created a duty on
the part of the company to fully investigate the status of XYZ's affairs
before disclosing to the public in late April that there was no reason for
concern.
3. The Ninth Circuit Approach
If the class of plaintiffs in this hypothetical filed suit in California,
however, they would be hard-pressed to survive the defendants' motion
to dismiss based on the limited information available to them as prescribed by the facts detailed in the scenario above. Adhering to the
Ninth Circuit's interpretation of the PSLRA, 46' a district court would be
bound to require the lOb-5 plaintiffs in this case to plead facts in great
detail that constituted "strong circumstantial evidence of deliberately
reckless or conscious misconduct,' 6 in order to enable them to survive
dismissal and gain entry into discovery, where they would hope to ascertain the requisite facts needed to prevail at trial. Unfortunately for the
161. Press v. Chemical Inv. Servs. Corp., 166 F.3d 529, 538 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Shields
v. Citytrust Bancorp, Inc., 25 F.3d 1124, 1128 (2d Cir. 1994)).
162. See discussion supra Parts ll.A.3, II.A.5, III.A.6.
163. See Greebel v. FITP Software, Inc., 194 F.3d 185, 196 (Ist Cir. 1999); Bryant v. Avado
Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1287 (11th Cir. 1999); In re Comshare, Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 542,

549 (6th Cir. 1999).
164. See discussion supra Part HLI.A.4.
165. In re Silicon Graphics Inc. See. Litig., 183 F.3d 970,974 (9th Cir. 1999).
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plaintiffs, they possess, at best, tenuous circumstantial evidence speaking to the necessary inference that the defendants acted deliberately
recklessly or consciously in orchestrating the alleged fraudulent scheme
of disseminating materially false information.
C. Summary
This basic hypothetical illustrates the serious implications of the
PSLRA circuit split and makes apparent the serious need for the split's
clear redress. Simple fairness seems to mandate that the plaintiffs in the
above scenario should not be barred outright from segueing into discovery where it appears likely that they would find more concrete facts substantiating their initial assertions. One must also, however, remain cognizant of the concerns and potential abuses accompanying the Second
Circuit's two-part approach insofar as "[g]reed is a ubiquitous motive,
and corporate insiders and upper management always have opportunity
to lie and manipulate."' 6 In seeking to reconcile the ambiguous scienter
requirement at the center of this split, though, one must not confuse notions of what should be with those of what Congress intended the
PSLRA to be. 67 In proceeding in the search for congressional meaning,
one must carefully parse the canons of statutory construction in a fashion similar to the approaches taken by a number of the circuits described above so that the true legislative intent of Congress may be discerned and carried out.'6
V. RECONCILING THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
Insofar as Congress, by drafting and adopting the PSLRA, intended
to effectuate a heightened burden of pleading for prospective plaintiffs
166. Bryant, 187 F.3d at 1286.
167. See Things Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca, 516 U.S. 124, 135 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
168. One caveat-many experts believe that canons of construction arc nonsense and that for
every canon there is a counter-canon. See, e.g., Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to be Construed, 3 VAND. L.
REv. 395, 401 (1950) (stating that "there are two opposing canons on almost every point"); Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation-Inthe Classroomand in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L.
REV. 800, 806 (1983) (asserting that while Professor Llewellyn's criticism of the canons are correct, "most of the canons are [also] just plain wrong"). Each of the circuits involved in this split,
however, sought to utilize the canons of construction in delving into the PSLRA's legislative history in an effort aimed at effectuating and carrying out Congress' intent. This Note, therefore, will
proceed under the presumption that a statute's legislative history bears, at a minimum, some probative value in discerning the legislative intent behind an ambiguously worded statute like the
PSLRA.
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seeking redress for alleged securities fraud, 6 9 this Note posits that the
United States Supreme Court should, and will, resolve the disunity
among the circuit courts in a manner consistent with the collective decisions of the First,' Sixth, 7 1 and Eleventh'72 Circuits. More specifically,
the Supreme Court should take the position that in having consciously
refrained from codifying the Second Circuit's motive-opportunity test,'73
Congress manifested an intent that plaintiffs be required to plead facts
establishing a "stronger inference" than that circuit's requisite two-part
showing in order to survive dismissal and segue into the discovery
phase of the litigation process. Furthermore, this Note concludes that
the Supreme Court should take the position that while Congress intended to effectuate a standard surpassing that of merely pleading facts
inferring motive and opportunity, the Ninth Circuit erred in interpreting
the PSLRA as requiring plaintiffs to allege facts strongly inferring that
the defendant acted with deliberate recklessness or conscious knowledge of its misconduct. 74
A. Effectuating Congress' Intent in Enacting the PSLRA
It is axiomatic "that the meaning of a statute must, in the first instance, be sought in the language in which the act is framed, and if that
is plain, ... the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to
its terms."'75 The PSLRA provides in its statutory text that a prospective
plaintiff bringing a Rule 1Ob-5 action must "state with particularity facts
giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind."' 76 The ambiguity of the PSLRA'7 7 arises by way of
Congress' failure to provide in the text of the Act both what the "re-

169. See supra note 47 and accompanying text (discussing the problems and abuses prompting Congress to draft and enact the PSLRA).
170. See Greebel v. FTP Software, Inc., 194 F.3d 185, 196 (1st Cir. 1999) (holding that under
the PSLRA, plaintiffs are required to plead facts "present[ing] a strong inference of scienter"
above and beyond that of mere motive and opportunity).
171. See In re Comshare, Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 542, 549 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding that a
pleading containing facts inferring motive and opportunity did not, in and of itself, give "rise to a
strong inference of recklessness" for the purposes of meeting the heightened pleading standard
created by the PSLRA).
172. See Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1287 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding that
"securities fraud plaintifffs] must plead scienter with particular facts that give rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted in a severely reckless manner").
173. See infra notes 200-06 and accompanying text.
174. See In re Silicon Graphics Inc. See. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 974 (9th Cir. 1999).

175. Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917).
176. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (Supp. IV 1999).
177. See supranotes 57-64 and accompanying text.
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quired state of mind" was and what constituted a sufficient showing of
that state of mind in the context of Rule lOb-5 causes of action.'
1. Identifying the "Required State of Mind" Under the PSLRA
The plain text of the PSLRA speaks only to the "required state of
mind" and does not on its face purport to change that state of mind.'
The overwhelming consensus of the circuit courts prior to the enactment
of the PSLRA was that a pleading of facts inferring recklessness sufficed for the purposes of pleading scienter in Rule lOb-5 cases.8 Assuming, as all of the circuits involved in this split have, that Congress'
silence in the text of the PSLRA regarding the circuits' collective interpretation of Ernst signifies a legislative acquiescence to that interpretation, this Note concludes that the plain meaning of the PSLRA reasonably embraces a showing of recklessness as sufficient for
establishing "the required state of mind."'
2. Identifying the Minimum Showing of the "Required State of
Mind" Under the PSLRA

Ironically, ambiguity surfaces by way of the precise confusion that
prompted Congress to adopt the PSLRA in the first place-namely, the
disunity among the circuit courts regarding the requisite showing of
facts required of a plaintiff alleging recklessness in order to create a sufficiently "strong inference" of that recklessness and survive dismissal. 3
Once again, the search for the answer to this question begins with the
178. See supra notes 57-64 and accompanying text.
179. See supra notes 57-64 and accompanying text.
180. See Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017, 1023 (6th Cir. 1979) (holding
that "[tihe overwhelming majority of courts to address this question after Hochfelder have concluded that recklessness satisfies the [section] 10(b)/Rule 10b-5 scienter requirement"); see also
Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1284 (11th Cir. 1999) (stating that "[elvery circuit
to address the question before the passage of the Reform Act held that a showing of recklessness
was sufficient to allege scienter").
181. Again, the circuits involved in this split had each interpreted the scienter requirement in
Ernstto include recklessness. See Bryant, 187 F.3d at 1284.
182. The six major circuit decisions discussed above, as well as the decision of the Fifth Circuit, all assumed as uncontroverted the conclusion that the PSLRA left unaltered their collective
recklessness interpretations. See id. As the court in Bryant astutely observed, "Congress was certainly aware of [the] well-established precedent when drafting the Reform Act" that every circuit
to address the question before the PSLRA had held that a showing of recklessness was sufficient to
allege scienter. Id. The court continued, stating that "[i]ndeed, when Congress codified 'the required state of mind,' it seems ... very clear that Congress was codifying the well-established law
that recklessness was sufficient to allege scienter." Id.
183. See supra Part lI.C (depicting the pre-PSLRA disunity among the circuit courts interpreting the requisite showing of facts necessary for inferring recklessness in compliance with
Ernst'sscienter threshold of intentional deception).
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plain meaning of the PSLRA's statutory text.'" Assuming, as this Note
has,' that a pleading of recklessness is sufficient for the purposes of the
PSLRA's "required state of mind,' ' 6 the text of the PSLRA plainly
reads that a private plaintiff alleging securities fraud in violation of Rule
lOb-5 must "state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with' "' recklessness. Inasmuch as the
PSLRA provides no statutory guidance in its text articulating what constitutes a satisfactory showing of a strong inference of recklessness,'
ambiguity is created; thus, warranting an examination of the Act's legislative history for further guidance in discerning Congress' intent."9
a. The PSLRA's Legislative History
The PSLRA's Conference Committee's Statement of Managers articulates "that the purpose of the Reform Act was to create uniformity
among the circuits and 'establish ... more stringent pleading requirements to curtail the filing of meritless lawsuits..... Unfortunately, as
with the text of the Act, that statement failed to provide express guidance for discerning the requisite strengthened pleading requirements of
the PSLRA."9' In In re Advanta Corp. Securities Litigation,'9 the Third
Circuit concluded that the PSLRA's relevant "legislative history [addressing this question was] contradictory and inconclusive."'" While the
proceeding analysis of that history illustrates that its probative value is
indeed limited, this Note finds it nevertheless helpful.
Proponents of an interpretation embracing the holdings of Press"4
and its progeny"' point to the PSLRA's Senate Committee Report,
184. See Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917).
185. See discussion supra Part V.A.1 (concluding that it is clear that Congress intended to
codify recldessness as "the required state of mind" in the PSLRA).
186. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (Supp. IV 1999).
187. Id. (emphasis added).

188. See id.
189. See Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896 (1984). Once again, this Note is proceeding
under the presumption that canons of contruction and a statute's legislative history bear, at a
minimum, some probative value in discerning the legislative intent of an ambiguously worded
statute. See supra note 168.
190. In re Advanta Corp. Sec. Litig., 180 F.3d 525, 532 (3d Cir. 1999) (alteration in original)
(quoting H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at 41 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 740);
see also supra note 47 and accompanying text (laying out a number of the abusive securities fraud
practices that prompted Congress to enact the PSLRA).
191. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at 41 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730,

740.
192. 180 F.3d 525 (3d Cir. 1999).
193. Id. at 533.
194. See Press v. Chemical Inv. Servs. Corp., 166 F.3d 529,538 (2d Cir. 1999).
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which clearly states that the Committee chose to adopt a uniform standard fashioned upon the preexisting pleading standard of the Second
Circuit.' 6 Advocates of this view" additionally cite the comments of

one of the PSLRA's co-sponsors explaining that it was Congress' intent
to codify the Second Circuit's pre-Act "pleadings standards."'93 The
Senate's subsequent adoption of an amendment to the original version
of the Reform Act that explicitly codified the language of the Second
Circuit's two-part test in the text of the PSLRA' 9 supports this interpretation.
195. See In re Advanta, 180 F.3d at 534; Williams v. WMX Techs., Inc., 112 F.3d 175, 178
(5th Cir. 1997).
196. See S. REP. No. 104-98, at 15 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 694. More
specifically, the Senate Report provides in pertinent part:
The Committee does not adopt a new and untested pleading standard that would generate additional litigation. Instead, the Committee chose a uniform standard modeled
upon the pleading standard of the Second Circuit.... (which] requires that the plaintiff
plead facts that give rise to a "strong inference" of defendant's fraudulent intent. The
Committee does not intend to codify the Second Circuit's caselaw interpreting this
pleading standard, although courts may find this body of law instructive.
Id.
197. Aside from the circuit courts which adopted this view, the SEC, as amicus, has been a
strong advocate of the position that the PSLRA did not prohibit the Second Circuit's preexisting
two-prong approach. See, e.g., Greebel v. FTP Software, Inc, 194 F.3d 185, 194 (stating that the
SEC views Congress' intent as embodying "the prior Second Circuit methods for proving scienter"). The fact that the SEC favors this interpretation should come as no surprise inasmuch as the
SEC is the body charged with promulgating the antifraud provisions under the two Securities Acts.
See supra note 9 and accompanying text. As such, the SEC is inherently predisposed to favor this
interpretation because it maximizes the number of cases surviving dismissal and thereby falling
within the ambit of the Securities Exchange Act.
198. See 141 CONG. REC. S17,960 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 1995) (statement of Sen. Dodd). A number of the circuit decisions also make mention of Congress' passage of the Securities Litigation
Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 (1998) (stating that neither
that Act nor the PSLRA in any way altered the scienter standard in securities fraud actions brought
pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act). This Note, however, questions the probative value of
that Act for the purposes of discerning the legislative intent of the PSLRA insofar as it was passed
over three years after the enactment of the PSLRA and was not subject to debate or criticism during the drafting and enrollment phases of the PSLRA. See ABNER J. MIKVA & ERIC LANE, AN
INTRODUCrION TO STATUTORY INTERPRETATION AND THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 36 (1997).
Mikva and Lane conclude that "[flor a piece of legislative history to be probative of legislative
intent, it must bear a significant relationship to the enactment process." Id. They continue:
"Postenactment explanations of legislative meaning would seem absolutely taboo.... First, such
postenactment statements are not part of the enactment process. Second, they are absolutely unreliable." Id. at 39; see also Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164, 185 (1994) (observing ".that the interpretation given by one Congress (or a committee or Member thereof) to an
earlier statute is of little assistance in discerning the meaning of that statute') (quoting Public
Employees Retirement Sys. v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158, 168 (1989)); Regional Rail Reorganization Act
Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 132 (1974) (stating that "post-passage remarks of legislators, however explicit, cannot serve to change the legislative intent of Congress").
199. See 141 CONG. REc. S9222 (daily ed. June 28, 1995).
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This Note, however, agrees with those advocating the rejection of
this interpretation, insofar as the aforementioned amendment, often referred to as the "Specter Amendment, ' ' w was eliminated after the joint
House and Senate Conference Committee convened to effectuate a harmonized version of the PSLRA.20' As the Ninth Circuit reasoned in In re
Silicon Graphics,m because the Conference Committee "expressly rejected the 'motive and opportunity' ... test[] when raising the standard,

Congress must have intended a standard that lies beyond the Second
Circuit standard."20 3
While the PSLRA's Conference Committee stated that the language of the Act was based on the pleading standard of the Second Circuit, it expressly cautioned that "[b]ecause the Conference Committee

intend[ed] to strengthen existing pleading requirements, it [did] not intend to codify the Second Circuit's case law interpreting this pleading
standard." 2' An accompanying footnote to that report additionally ex-

plained that "[flor this reason, the Conference Report chose not to include in the pleading standard certain language relating to motive, op-

portunity, or recklessness."2 ' This language was interpreted by many,
including President Clinton, ta as signifying a congressional intent effectuating a heightened pleading standard, surpassing that of the Second
Circuit's preexisting approach.

200. This Amendment became known as the "Specter Amendment" in reference to the bill's
sponsor and chief advocate, Senator Arlen Specter of Pennsylvania. See 141 CONG. REc. S9170
(daily ed. June 27, 1995); see also Melvin I. Weiss & Deborah Clark-Weintraub, Private Securities Litigation Reform Act: SignificantDevelopments Since Enactment in 1995, 218 N.Y. L.J. 7, 9
(1997).
201. See In re Advanta Corp. Sec. Litig., 180 F.3d 525, 531 (3d Cir. 1999); H.R. CoNF. REP.
No. 104-369, at 31 (1995), reprintedin 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 730.
202. 183 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 1999).
203. Id. at 979. The Ninth Circuit continued:
Had Congress merely sought to adopt the Second Circuit standard, it easily could have
done so.... It follows that plaintiffs proceeding under the PSLRA can no longer aver
intent in general terms of mere "motive and opportunity" or "recklessness," but rather,
must state specific facts indicating no less than a degree of recklessness that strongly
suggests actual intent.
Id.
204. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 104-369, at4l (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730,740.
205. Id. at 48 n.23.
206. Because he believed the Statement of Managers made clear their intent to raise the
pleading standard above that of the Second Circuit's pre-PSLRA approach, President Clinton vetoed the Reform Act on the grounds that it "impose[d] an unacceptable procedural hurdle to meritorious claims being heard in Federal courts." 141 CoNG. REc. H15,215 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 1995).
That veto was subsequently overridden by over two-thirds of both houses of Congress and the
PSLRA was enacted into law. See 141 CONG. REc. H15,223-24 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 1995); 141
CONG. REc. S19,180 (daily ed. Dec. 22, 1995).
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The Ninth Circuit adopted this position as well.2 WIn the process,
though, that Circuit effectuated an even higher standard requiring a de-

tailed pleading of facts bordering on intentional misconduct." 3 After
going through a similar critique of the Act and its legislative history, the
Ninth Circuit reasoned that Congress had intended to "bar" those complaints failing to allege facts giving rise to a strong inference of deliberate recklessness or conscious misconduct.' The court reached this con-

clusion by focusing on the collective recklessness interpretations of the
circuit courts interpreting the Supreme Court's decision in Ernst.=0 Re-

iterating that the decision in Ernst established that "'scienter' referr[ed]
to a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud,"21'
the Ninth Circuit interpreted the PSLRA's statutory language as
meaning "that the evidence [alleged] must create a strong inference of,
at a minimum, 'deliberate recklessness."'2 1 Hence, that circuit sought to
substantiate its extended recklessness interpretation by reading
214 Ernst's
intentional conduct language into the language of the PSLRA.
This Note is of the position, however, that while the Ninth Circuit
2 s
was correct in rejecting Press
and its progeny,1 6 that circuit's extended interpretation is inconsistent with the PSLRA's plain textual
meaning.217 This Note has concluded that Congress' enactment of the

PSLRA signified a legislative acquiescence to the circuits' collective
interpretation of recklessness as sufficient for the purposes of pleading

207. See In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 974 (9th Cir. 1999).
208. See id. More specifically, the court in that case required a plaintiff pleading scienter to
"plead, in great detail, facts that constitute strong circumstantial evidence of deliberately reckless
or conscious misconduct." Id.
209. See id. at 975.
210. See Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017, 1023 (6th Cir. 1979) (holding
that "[tihe overwhelming majority of courts to address this question after Hochfelder have concluded that recklessness satisfies the [section] 10(b)/Rule lOb-5 scienter requirement"); see also
Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1284 (1lth Cir. 1999) (stating that "[e]very circuit
to address the question before the passage of the Reform Act held that a showing of recklessness
was sufficient to allege scienter").
211. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194 n.12 (1975).
212. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (Supp. IV 1999) (requiring the pleading of "particulari[zed]
facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind").
213. In re Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 977.
214. See id.
215. Press v. Chemical Inv. Servs. Corp., 166 F.3d 529 (2d Cir. 1999).
216. See In re Advanta Corp. Sec. Litig., 180 F.3d 525 (3d Cir. 1999); see also Williams v,
WMX Techs., Inc., 112 F.3d 175 (5th Cir. 1997) (adopting the Second Circuit's pre-PSLRA approach without discussion).
217. For the reasoning articulated by this Note substantiating its conclusion that the plain text
of the PSLRA leaves the collective recklessness interpretation of the circuit courts unaltered for
the purposes of pleading scienter, see supra Part V.A.1.
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scienter. 2's For this reason, the standard announced by the Ninth Circuit
is inconsistent with the PSLRA's plain language.219 By effectuating an
interpretation requiring the pleading of facts constituting an inference
that the defendant(s) acted with deliberate recklessness, m the Ninth Circuit altered the "strong inference" showing plainly codified by Congress
in the PSLRA's text.22' As such, this Note concludes that the correct
pleading standard for plaintiffs under the PSLRA is logically one that
lies below that court's stringent mandate.
b. The PSLRA's Plain Text
Irrespective of reaching the conclusion that Congress intended to
refrain from adopting the Second Circuit's preexisting motiveopportunity test via the avenue of legislative history,2 a careful parsing
of the PSLRA's plain text supports this conclusion on alternative
grounds as well. In Bryant, 3 the Eleventh Circuit reasoned that the text
of the PSLRA, requiring the pleading of facts strongly inferring "the required state of mind, '' . "clearly refer[red] to a substantive standard ... like willfulness or recklessness. Motive and opportunity, on the
other hand, do not constitute a substantive standard; rather, motive and
opportunity are specific kinds of evidence, which along with other evi' 'm
dence might contribute to an inference of recklessness or willfulness."
Thus, a pure statutory construction analysis provides an alternatively
persuasive basis for concluding that the PSLRA effectuated a heightened standard surpassing the pleading threshold of the Second Circuit's
preexisting approach.
B. Conclusion
The PSLRA's plain language and limited probative legislative
history militate in favor of reconciling the circuit split with an intermediate pleading standard of recklessness that lies between the interpreta-

213. See supraPart V.A.1.
219. "Rather than changing the substantive standard, the statute explicitly incorporated the
existing standard; the statute refers to 'the required state of mind.' ... Congress plainly intended to
codify the well-established law that some form of recklessness was included within the required
state of mind." Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1284 n.21 (1lth Cir. 1999).
220. See In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 974 (9th Cir. 1999).
221. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (Supp. IV 1999).
222. See supraPart V.A.2.a.
223. 187 F.3d 1271 (llthCir. 1999).
224. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2).
225. Bryant, 187 F.3d at 1286.
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tions of the Second and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals. While recognizing and paying deference to the troubling ambiguity surrounding the
PSLRA issue, this Note once again reverts to Congress' intent, which
was aimed at establishing a fact sensitive standard that recognizes
averments giving rise to a "strong inference" of recklessness' as sufficient for the purposes of satisfactorily pleading scienter under the
PSLRA. Such a standard empowers the district judge with the discretion
necessary for weighing the fact sensitive details and circumstances enveloping each case to determine whether a sufficiently "strong inference" of recklessness has been pled.
While framed in the background of a circuit split among the federal
courts of appeals, the tension belying this split is one bristling with serious ramifications for both aggrieved shareholders and the overall judicial system. On one side is the clear intent of Congress to provide redress for injured plaintiffs in order to bring about consistency and
legitimacy to the country's capital markets.27 On the other side, however, is Congress' enactment of the PSLRA in an effort aimed at ameliorating the likelihood of abusive practices stemming from the manipulation of that Act.m
Perhaps the ambiguity of the PSLRA that prompted the split is representative of the circuits' collective effort to bring about an equitable
balance to the tension of providing redress for legitimately injured
plaintiffs, while minimizing the potential for fraudulent securities practices and abuses. In any event, it is not the role of the judiciary to effectuate, under the guise of its equitable powers, an interpretation of the
PSLRA in a fashion not expressly within the intentions of Congress. 2"

226. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2).
227. This was Congress' rationale and motivation in enacting the Securities Exchange Act of
1934. See supra note 47 and accompanying text (outlining the abuses and conduct prompting
Congress' enactment).
228. See supra note 47 and accompanying text (detailing the abusive securities practices
stemming from the pre-PSLRA disunity among the circuits that prompted Congress to raise the
level of scienter through the enactment of the PSLRA in a self-proclaimed effort to flush out and
curb the excessive filing of fraudulent and meritless claims).
229. See Things Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca, 516 U.S. 124, 135 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
Personal experience has revealed that the nearly universal view among federal judges is
that when we are called upon to interpret statutes, it is our primary responsibility,
within constitutional limits, to subordinate our wishes to the will of Congress because
the legislators' collective intention, however discerned, trumps the will of the court.
Patricia M. Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper: The Use of Legislative History in Construing Statutes in
the 1988-89 Term of the United States Supreme Court, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 277, 281 (1989).
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Tantamount to this Note's ultimate conclusion is the premise that
courts evaluating complaints for the requisite strong inference of recklessness are precluded from allowing plaintiffs pleading mere motive
and opportunity to survive dismissal.2'0 By prohibiting as sufficient a
bare showing of motive and opportunity, the abusive "strike suit" and
other concerns originally prompting Congress' enactment of the PSLRA
remain adequately addressed.2' In any event, facts inferring such a
showing are often relevant and helpful in establishing a sufficient
pleading of scienter and, under this Note's approach, can still be utilized
for these purposes. zn Additionally, the conclusion that the PSLRA did
not effectuate the "strong inference of deliberate recklessness" approach
adopted by the Ninth CircuitC3 reduces the likelihood of onerously precluding legitimate shareholders from the statutory redresses of section
10(b) and Rule lOb-5, which were enacted and promulgated for their
safeguard and protection.'

In concluding that this split should be interpreted in a manner consistent with the interpretations of the First, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits,

it must be recognized that such a conclusion is not free from speculation
or debate.2 s The pervasive ambiguity in the PSLRA's text and legislative history militates in favor of either judicial or congressional clarifi-

cation in order to reconcile the disunity and bring harmony to this
split.26 Upon such intervention, this Note predicts that inasmuch as the

decisions of the Second Circuit in Press and the Ninth Circuit in In re
230. See supra notes 200-14 and accompanying text for the reasoning and analysis fortifying
this conclusion.
231. See supra note 47 and accompanying text detailing, in addition to strike suits, a number
of the abusive securities law practices that prompted Congress to enact the PSLRA.
232. See, e.g., In re Comshare, Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 542, 551 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding
that a pleading of facts establishing motive and opportunity may be relevant to creating a strong
inference of scienter, but that such a pleading was not in and of itself enough).
233. In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970,974 (9th Cir. 1999).
234. See I Loss & SEUGMAN, supra note 2, at 226-27 (summarizing the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 and stating that the Act's purpose was "to prevent and afford remedies for fraud in
securities trading and manipulation of the markets").
235. After all, if there was a clear solution to interpreting the PSLRA question, the probability
is high that the circuits would not have divided in the drastic fashion that they have. See Smith,
supra note 36, at 613 (stating that "'[t]he fact that [different] courts, in well-reasoned opinions,
provide different assessments of Congress' intent illustrates the inherent ambiguity of the legislative record."' (quoting Zeid v. Kimberley, 973 F. Supp. 910, 912 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (first alteration
in original)).
236. In light of the PSLRA's "inconclusive and inconsistent" legislative intent, it appears that
Congress agreed to disagree on this elusive standard. See, e.g., Greebel v. FIT Software, Inc., 194
F.3d 185, 195 (1st Cir. 1999) (concluding that "[a]t best, there appears to have been an agreement
to disagree on the issue of Second Circuit standards (other than the strong inference standard), and
perhaps, as is common, to leave such matters for courts to resolve").
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Silicon GraphicsSecurities Litigation run afoul with the plain meaning
of the PSLRA and that Act's limited probative legislative history, the
aforementioned and described intermediate fact specific interpretation
will be recognized as best effectuating and reconciling the ambiguous
congressional intent underlying the enactment of the PSLRA.
Bradley R. Aronstam*

* This Note, like all of my undertakings in life, is dedicated to the memory of my father,
Robert Aronstam; a man whose courage, strength, and love I carry with me in all of my endeavors
and activities, death having no dominion over what the two of us share. I would like to specifically
thank Professor Julian Velasco of the Hofstra University School of Law for his invaluable assistance with the editing and revising of this Note; as well as all of the Editors and Staff Members of
Volumes 28 and 29 of the Hofstra Law Review whose professionalism and dedication make it an
absolute honor to be associated with and published in this Law Review. Finally, and most importantly, I would like to express my immeasurable gratitude and love to my family for their unconditional love, support, and guidance throughout my career in law school and in everything that I
do. Their inspiration and example are treasures that mean more to me than I could ever hope to
express.
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